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The Missouri Campaign of 1864—Report of General Stirling Price.

[We have been very anxious to publish reports of the campaign in the Trans-Mississippi department, and are glad to be able to give the following report of General Price's operations in 1864, which was not published by the Confederate Government. It will be read with great interest not only by those who served with that gallant army but by all who desire to know the truth concerning this important campaign]

SHREVEPORT, LA.

Brigadier-General W. R. BOGGS, *Chief of Staff*:

General—I have the honor to make the following report of my operations in the late expedition to Missouri. I regret to state that the report is meagre and incomplete, for the reason that Major-General Marmaduke and Brigadier-General Cabell, who bore so honorable and conspicuous a share in the greater part of the expedition, were captured before its close and are prisoners in the hands of the enemy; whilst Major-General Fagan, who commanded the Arkansas troops, composing a large part of the forces engaged, has as yet been unable to make any report, nor have any been received from the subordinate commanders. In conformity with the letter

of instructions from General E. Kirby Smith, dated 11th August, 1864, I made immediate arrangements for a movement into Missouri, as concluded upon in my interview and conference with him upon that subject, with the cavalry force in the District of Arkansas, then under my command—being promised, in addition, the brigade of Louisiana cavalry, commanded by Colonel Harrison, estimated at 1,500 strong. At the same time information in full detail of the proposed movement, of the route to be pursued and of the probable time when it would be made, was, without delay, sent by me to Brigadier-General Shelby, who then commanded in Northeast Arkansas, with instructions to make an attack, when in his judgment he should deem advisable, upon Du Vall's bluff and the railroad between Little Rock and White river, in the possession of the enemy, and by diverting their attention, enable me to cross the lower Arkansas and unite our forces without danger of failure. These instructions were carried out in full by General Shelby, and resulted in an attack upon the railroad, terminating in the most complete success—over four hundred Federals captured, three hundred killed and wounded, six forts taken and destroyed, ten miles of railroad destroyed, as well as vast quantities of forage, &c.; full particulars of which are contained in General Shelby's report accompanying. This exploit was one of the most brilliant of the war, and cast additional lustre upon the well earned fame of that gallant General and the officers and men under his command. It was part of the plan concluded upon that I should cross the Arkansas river about the 20th of August, with the troops under my immediate command; but from delay in receiving the necessary ordnance stores I was unable to do so. Finally, the required complement was received on the 27th, and on the 28th of August I was relieved from the command of the District of Arkansas and crossed the Ouachita river. On the 29th arrived at Princeton, where the divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke were, and assumed command of all the cavalry in the District of Arkansas, according to the instructions of General Smith above referred to. In the meantime, owing to the delay in starting, I was of the opinion that the enemy had become informed of my intended line of march, and concluded to cross the Arkansas river at the most feasible point north of Little Rock and south of Fort Smith, taking into consideration the probable means of obtaining forage and subsistence.

On the 30th I took up my line of march in the direction of Little

Rock, and arrived that afternoon at Tulip, a distance of nine miles. Colonel Harrison's brigade had not yet arrived, but as I could wait no longer, I left instructions at Princeton, directing him, if he should arrive there within three days, to follow on and form a junction with me, giving him information of the route I should take; but in case he did not reach Princeton in that time, he should then report to the commanding officer of the District of Arkansas. Colonel Harrison did not take part in the expedition.

On the morning of the 31st I resumed my march in the same direction as on the previous day, and continued on the same until within seven miles of Benton, when I diverged to the left, taking a northwest direction, sending Major-General Fagan across the Saline river to make a demonstration towards Little Rock and to protect my right flank. On the 5th September he joined me, bringing up the rear. I reached Dardanelle, on the Arkansas river, a distance of 167 miles from Camden, on 6th September. The country through which I had passed was hilly and in some parts mountainous, sparsely settled, but plenty of forage and subsistence was obtained. The Arkansas being fordable at this point, on the 7th I crossed and marched to Dover, a distance of fourteen miles. Major-General Marmaduke, with his division, and part of his train, had already crossed before my arrival, thus covering the crossing of the remainder of the army.

At Princeton verbal and written communications had been sent to Brigadier-General Shelby, apprising him of the changes of route, and directing him to join me at Batesville. But up to this time I had received no information from him of his movements or position. I resumed the march in the direction of the last mentioned point—Major-General Fagan, with his command, marching along the Springfield road, and Major-General Marmaduke and headquarters train the Clinton road; taking separate roads on account of the scarcity of forage, and to rid that section of country of deserters and Federal jayhawkers, as they are termed (*i. e.*, robbers and murderers), with which that country is infested. These bands, however, dispersed and took refuge in the mountains at the approach of the army; several were killed and a few taken prisoners. Arriving at Little Red river on the 10th, and still without information of the position or movements of General Shelby, I dispatched an officer of known skill and daring to communicate with him, directing that he should unite himself with the rest of the command at once. On the 18th I arrived at a point on White river,

eighteen miles above Batesville, and received information that Brigadier-General Shelby was at Powhatan, about sixty-four miles northeast of Batesville, and on the selected route to Missouri. I adopted the town of Pocahontas as the point of rendezvous, and directed Major-General Marmaduke, with his own command and train and that of headquarters, to march to that point direct, while I proceeded to Batesville and thence to Powhatan. Major-General Fagan, with his division, who had arrived at Batesville, marched to Powhatan on the left. I arrived on the 13th September and found General Shelby with part of his command. Reached Pocahontas the next day, and then the remainder of Shelby's command reported, including the brigades of Jackman, McCroy and Dobbins. In fine, the whole army was concentrated. The country over which I had passed was rugged and mountainous in the extreme, and had damaged the transportation to some extent, but it had been or was on the point of being repaired; and on the other hand, by adopting the routes marched over, sufficient forage and subsistence had been obtained.

The towns and villages through which I had passed had been robbed, pillaged, burned and otherwise destroyed by the enemy, and were nearly deserted by the former inhabitants; in fact, the whole country presented but a scene of desolation.

Upon arriving at Pocahontas I proceeded to organize the army, which was completed on the 18th, as follows:

Fagan's division, commanded by Major-General J. F. Fagan, composed of Brigadier-General W. L. Cabell's brigade, Colonel Slemmons', Colonel McCroy's and Colonel Dobbins' brigades, Colonels Lyle's and Rogan's commands, and Captain Andrews' battalion.

Marmaduke's division, commanded by Major-General J. S. Marmaduke, composed of Brigadier-General John B. Clark's and Colonel Freeman's brigades, Colonel Kitchen's regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Wood's battalion.

Shelby's division, commanded by Brigadier-General J. O. Shelby, consisted of Colonels Shanks' and Jackson's brigades, and Colonel Coleman's command.

Having determined to invade Missouri in three columns, General Fagan with his division was ordered to march to Fredericktown, Missouri, by the way of Martinsburg, Reeve's station and Greenville. Major-General Marmaduke with his division was ordered to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, Missouri, to the right of the route to be followed by Fagan's division, as above designated;

varying from it ten to thirty miles, or as near within those limits as might be practicable on account of the roads and forage. Shelby with his command was to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, by a route to the left of General Fagan's, varying from ten to twenty miles, as nearly as practicable, on account of roads and forage. Headquarters to march with the centre column. At Fredericktown the three divisions were ordered to form a junction. A map of the route to be followed was furnished each of the division commanders. The most stringent orders were issued against straggling and pillaging under the severest penalties, and the division commanders were earnestly enjoined to use their utmost endeavors to have the orders carried into effect in every particular and without delay.

On the 19th of September the army marched in the order above designated, and on that day I entered Missouri with 12,000 men—only 8,000, however, armed—and fourteen pieces of artillery, and on the 24th of September reached Fredericktown, Missouri, with the centre column. Brigadier-General Shelby was in the advance, passing, in his route, through Doniphan and Patterson; whilst Major-General Marmaduke, whose route was by Poplar bluff, Castorville and Dallas, had not yet come up. On the 19th, before Brigadier-General Shelby reached Doniphan, news of the arrival of the army having been received, a force of the enemy, composed of a part of the Federal Missouri Twelfth cavalry, then occupying the place, withdrew, first setting fire to the town, which was consumed, and retreated to Pender's mills (burning the houses of citizens as they passed), where they were overtaken the next day and routed, with a loss of a lieutenant and three men killed, four wounded and six prisoners, besides several horses and small arms; our loss two killed and five wounded.

On the 22d Brigadier-General Shelby attacked the town of Patterson, but the garrison having received information of his approach hastily evacuated the place, with a loss of twenty-eight killed and several wounded, also a telegraph battery and operator captured; no loss on our part.

On the 25th I remained at Fredericktown awaiting the arrival of Marmaduke's division, which came up that evening within eight miles of the place. General Marmaduke on his route had a few skirmishes with the Federal militia, killing and wounding four and capturing eleven. Colonel Jeffries, of Marmaduke's division, had, before the arrival of the army at Pocahontas, been sent with his regiment to Bloomfield, Missouri, which the enemy evacuated on

his approach, killing a number and capturing arms and six wagon loads of army stores. He rejoined his brigade (Clark's) on the 24th; detached again on the 25th, he attacked and, by a gallant charge, drove the enemy out of the town of old Jackson. For particulars see Brigadier-General Clark's report. I received at Fredericktown satisfactory evidence that the strength of the enemy at Ironton was about 1,500, and that the Federal General A. J. Smith was camped about ten miles from Saint Louis with his corps, composed of about eight thousand infantry, on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain railroad. I immediately ordered Brigadier-General Shelby to proceed at once with his division, by way of Farmington, to a point on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain railroad, where there were then five bridges in close proximity to each other, to destroy the railroad there and the bridges, and after effecting that object to fall back in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, which would effectually prevent General A. J. Smith from reinforcing the garrison at those places, which I would attack and take with the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke. General Shelby proceeded to the point indicated and performed the duty assigned him in the most complete and effectual manner, destroying the splendid bridge at Irondale as well as the three mentioned, tearing up miles and miles of the track, burning the ties, rails, &c. For full particulars, reference is made to his report accompanying. On the morning of the 26th, being rejoined by Major-General Marmaduke with his division, I proceeded at an early hour, with his and Fagan's divisions, in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, at the same time sending forward a portion of Fagan's division to take and hold a difficult pass in that direction, between two mountains, within three and four miles of Ironton. This was effected rapidly and with success. That evening I sent forward the remainder of his division, leaving his train at Saint Francois creek, where forage could be obtained for the animals, and where I encamped for the night with the rest of the command. That evening General Fagan drove in the Federal pickets at Arcadia and took position before the town for the night. Next morning he drove the enemy from Arcadia, where they abandoned a very strong position, through Ironton, where he also took a strong fort, in a most gallant and brilliant manner. The enemy took refuge behind their fortifications at Pilot Knob. Having received such information as appeared to be perfectly reliable concerning the character and strength of the fortifications as induced me to believe that the

place could be taken without great loss, I accordingly directed Major-General Marmaduke to take possession of Shepherd's mountain, which was west of the fortifications and completely commanded them. This was most satisfactorily accomplished, and his artillery placed in position on the mountain. Major-General Fagan formed on the south and east. Skirmishing took place all the day, and firing of artillery from the enemy until 2 P. M., when a charge was ordered and made in the most gallant and determined manner, officers and men vieing with each other, in both divisions, in deeds of unsurpassed bravery, charging up to the muzzles of the enemy's cannon. Where all acted as heroes, it would seem almost invidious to make any exception; but I must be allowed to call attention to the courage and gallantry of General Cabell in leading his men to the assault, having his horse killed under him within forty yards of the fort. But the information I had received in regard to the strength of the fortifications, proved totally incorrect. Our troops were repulsed; and it being too late to renew the assault, they were withdrawn beyond reach of the enemy's guns, and preparations were made for a renewal of the assault on next day. I had dispatched a courier, on the morning of the 27th, to Brigadier-General Shelby, informing him of the proposed operations, and directing him to rejoin the main army to assist in the attack, and on the evening of the 27th another courier was dispatched, informing him of the capture of Arcadia and Ironton, and of the repulse at Pilot Knob, and of my design to renew there the attack on the following morning, and hoping that the courier would meet him on the way, instructed him to join me, as also the route to pursue. Neither of these communications, as it appears, was received by Brigadier-General Shelby, who, having heard that there was a force of the enemy at Potosi, had left the railroad and marched to attack them at that place, which was captured by him, with its garrison of one hundred and fifty Federals, arms, &c. The depot of the railroad at that place, with seven fine cars, were also destroyed. For full particulars, reference is made to the accompany report of Brigadier-General Shelby.

The enemy at Pilot Knob, on the night following the first attack, evacuated the fort, blowing up the magazine, leaving in my possession sixteen pieces of artillery, a large number of small arms, a large amount of army stores, consisting of bales of blankets, hundreds of barrels of flour and bacon, quantities of coffee, &c. After destroying the artillery, which I could not take with me, and dis-

tributing among the troops such of the stores as were needed, I moved my command twelve miles on the road the enemy had retreated, sending Marmaduke forward in pursuit, in command of his own and Shelby's divisions, which had rejoined the command. Untiring pursuit was made night and day, but it was not until the evening of the following day that he was overtaken, owing to the natural difficulties presented by the country over which the enemy retreated. Major-General Marmaduke, who was in advance, fought him until an hour before sunset, when Shelby was thrown in front and the fight continued until dark. The enemy having thrown up fortifications during the night, it was deemed not advisable to renew the attack, and the forces were withdrawn. The particulars in full are contained in accompanying reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark.

My loss in this effort I cannot give, as I have no report from Fagan's division, but the loss in Marmaduke's division was fourteen officers and eighty men killed and wounded. The loss in Fagan's division was doubtless greater. Whilst at Ironton, receiving information that the Federal forces exceeded my own two to one, and knowing the city to be strongly fortified, I determined to move as fast as possible on Jefferson City, destroying the railroad as I went, with a hope to capture that city with its troops and munitions of war. I arrived at Richwoods on the 30th, having passed through Potosi. Lieutenant Christian, whom I had sent to the Mississippi river before I left Camden for the purpose of obtaining gun-caps, joined me at this place, bringing 150,000. Lieutenant Christian is a most energetic and efficient officer, and deserves especial notice. Major-General Fagan sent 300 men to De Soto to destroy the depot, which was effected, and the militia, who had gathered there in some numbers, at the same time was scattered. At the same time, General Cabell was sent with his brigade to cut the Pacific railroad, east of Franklin, which he did effectually, also burning the depot in that town. On the 29th, Colonel Burbridge and Lieutenant-Colonel Wood were detached by Major-General Marmaduke and sent to Cuba to destroy the depots on the Southwest branch of the Pacific railroad at that place, which they succeeded in doing. The divisions of Marmaduke and Shelby tore up several miles of the Southwest branch of the Pacific railroad. For full details, see reports of Brigadier-Generals Clark and Shelby. Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, of Marmaduke's division, destroyed the important bridge over the Moselle. These two divisions were sent

forward in the direction of Union, which was captured by Brigadier-General Clark, killing thirty-two and wounding seventy of the Federal garrison. On the 2d of October Clark's brigade took possession of Washington without opposition and destroyed the Pacific railroad bridge about two miles from that place. On the 3d a train was captured at Miller's station, with a large amount of clothing and four hundred Sharp's rifles. On the same evening the town of Hermann was taken possession of, after a slight opposition (the enemy abandoning a six-pound iron gun), by Clark's brigade; for particulars, see report of Brigadier-General Clark, with the accompanying report of Colonel Green. On the 4th of October Major-General Marmaduke sent four hundred men with one gun, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, to destroy the Pacific railroad bridge over the Gasconade river, which he effected. Linn was captured with one hundred prisoners and as many arms by a portion of Shelby's division. On the 6th Brigadier-General Shelby sent a force under Colonel Shanks to destroy the bridge over the Osage, on the Pacific railroad, which was successfully accomplished. A passage was there forced by him across the Osage, six miles below Castle Rock. The enemy disputed the passage warmly, but in vain. In this action the gallant Colonel Shanks received a severe if not mortal wound, and was left in the hands of friends to be cared for; he afterwards fell into the possession of the enemy, and is reported to have since died—a loss greatly to be deplored. He was ever foremost in battle and last in retreat; his death would be regretted by all who mourn the loss of the good and the brave. At the same time Colonel Shanks forced the passage of the Osage as stated, Colonel Gordon, of the same division, forced its passage at Castle Rock, and the division bivouacked that night seven miles from Jefferson City. On the next morning Major-General Fagan was thrown in front with his division, and on the march came upon the enemy five miles from Jefferson City, in large force. A hotly contested battle immediately ensued, but the enemy was gradually driven back to Moscow creek, when being reinforced they again made an obstinate resistance, but were finally routed and forced to seek shelter in their entrenchments—Fagan occupying the heights in full view of the city. On this occasion Major-General Fagan handled his troops with marked skill and ability, under my own immediate observation. Night approaching, I determined to move my forces two miles south of the city, where water and forage were abundant. Did so, and encamped for the night. I had received

positive information that the enemy were 12,000 strong in the city, and that 3,000 more had arrived on the opposite bank of the river, by the North Missouri railroad, before I withdrew to the encampment selected; whereupon I gave immediate instructions to Brigadier-General Shelby to send a sufficient force to burn the bridges and destroy the railroad west of Jefferson City, in the direction of California, the county seat of Moniteau county; and after a consultation with my general officers, I determined not to attack the enemy in his entrenchments, as they outnumbered me two to one and were strongly fortified, but to move my command in the direction of Kansas, as instructed in my original orders, hoping to be able to capture a sufficient number of arms to arm my unarmed men at Booneville, Sedalia, Lexington and Independence—places which I intended to occupy en route. The next day I accordingly marched towards Kansas and was followed by General McNeill, who made an attack on my rear guard, Fagan's division, but was easily repulsed. General Shelby's division, constituting my advance, reached California on the 7th, having sent a portion of his command to destroy the Pacific railroad, which it did, track, bridges, &c.; passing rapidly on to Booneville he, by a rapid charge, drove in their pickets and the garrison took refuge in their entrenchments. Brigadier-General Shelby, disposing his forces in such a manner as to prevent the arrival of reinforcements, awaited until his artillery could come up. In the meantime propositions for the surrender of the town were made to him and accepted. Accordingly, the place, its garrison, stores, &c., were delivered into his hands. For particulars, reference is made to his accompanying report.

I followed on with the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke, and camped on the night of the 8th fourteen miles from Jefferson City. On the 9th marched through and beyond California, making twenty-six miles. On the 10th arrived at Booneville with the rest of the command. My reception was enthusiastic in the extreme—old and young, men, women and children vied in their salutations and in ministering to the wants and comforts of my wearied and war-worn soldiers. About 300 prisoners were captured at Booneville, with arms, ammunition and many stores, which were distributed among the soldiers. On the 11th, hearing of the approach of General McNeill, with a cavalry force estimated at 2,500 men, for the purpose of attacking Booneville by the Tipton road, I selected my position about half a mile from the river, and placed the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke in

line of battle to receive him. The enemy attacked them, but was easily driven back with loss, and was pursued by a portion of Fagan's division and Jackman's brigade a distance of twenty-one miles from Booneville, with heavy loss, in spite of an obstinate resistance and the ruggedness of the country over which the pursuit was made.

For full particulars of the action, so far as his own troops were concerned, see report of Colonel Jackman accompanying.

Captain Anderson, who that day reported to me with about 100 men, was sent to destroy the North Missouri railroad; at the same time Quantrell, with the men under his command, was sent to destroy the Hannibal and Saint Joseph railroad, to prevent, if possible, the enemy from throwing their forces from Saint Louis in my front. These officers, I was afterwards informed, did some damage to the roads, but none of advantage, and totally failed in the main object proposed, which was to destroy the large railroad bridge in the edge of Saint Charles county. I moved that evening from Booneville to Chatteau Springs, on my proposed route, a distance of eleven miles, having recruited at Booneville 1,200 or 1,500 men, mostly unarmed. That night, receiving information that there was 5,000 stand of arms stored in the city hall at Glasgow, I sent Brigadier-General Clark, of Marmaduke's division, with his own brigade and 500 of Jackman's, with orders to cross the river at Arrow Rock and attack the place the next morning at daybreak and capture it; at the same time sending Brigadier-General Shelby, with a small portion of his division and a section of artillery, to attack the town at the same hour from the west side of the river, to divert the attention of the enemy and protect their advance under cover of the fire from his artillery. Owing to unforeseen difficulties in crossing the river, Brigadier-General Clark was unable to commence the attack for an hour after Brigadier-General Shelby had engaged them. The place was surrendered, but not until the City Hall was destroyed and the arms consumed by fire. However, we obtained eight hundred or nine hundred prisoners, 1,200 small arms, about the same number of overcoats, one hundred and fifty horses, one steamboat, and a large amount of under-clothing. This enterprise was a great success, effected with but small loss on our side and reflects great honor on all parties concerned. The prisoners were paroled, such of the ordnance and other stores as could be carried were distributed and the remainder with the steamboat burned. For particulars, reference is made to the accompanying reports of

Generals Clark and Shelby. In the awards of praise contained, the Commanding-General cordially concurs.

On the night of the 13th encamped at Mr. Marshall's, marching fourteen miles, and on the next day to Jonesboro', eight miles, where I was joined by General Fagan, who had been left behind at the Lamine. I then ordered Brigadier-General M. Jeff. Thompson, then commanding Shelby's old brigade, to take with him a force of not less than eight hundred or one thousand men and one section of artillery by Longwood and thence to Sedalia and to attack the Federals at that place, if he should deem it prudent and advisable. This order was promptly and completely carried out by General Thompson; the place, though strongly fortified and well garrisoned, was carried by a bold and daring assault, and fell into our hands with over two hundred prisoners, who were paroled, several hundred stand of arms, many pistols and wagon loads of goods suitable to soldiers. Reference is made to the accompanying reports of Generals Shelby and Thompson. The latter withdrew on the approach of a large force of the enemy.

On the 15th I reached Keisus, having passed through Marshall, marching seventeen miles, where I remained two days awaiting General Clark, for whose safety I began to entertain fears, inasmuch as information had been received that the enemy were on my left flank and in my rear in large force. Previous to the attack on Sedalia, the large and magnificent bridge over the Lamine, on the Pacific railroad, had been destroyed by Lieutenant James Wood, of Elliott's battalion, who had been sent there for that purpose by General Shelby. On the 17th I received information that the enemy (Kansas troops) had entered Lexington on the 16th. On the 17th I also received news of the capture of Sedalia by General Thompson. On the 18th, having been joined by Shelby's division and Clark's brigade of Marmaduke's division, I marched to Waverly, twenty-two miles.

On leaving Pocahontas I had sent an agent of great intelligence and tact into Saint Louis to ascertain the strength of the enemy at that city, with instructions to report to me if possible at Potosi. He was, however, so closely watched that he could not join me until I had passed that city. Upon overtaking me he informed me that I would be pursued by 24,000 men from Saint Louis and 15,000 from Jefferson City, which, with the force in my front from Kansas, he believed to be the entire force with which I would have to contend.

I then abandoned my former determination to issue an address to the people, calling upon them to rally to me, as they were already pouring in so rapidly that I knew I would not be able to protect and feed them, and as it would require that my army should be kept together to protect them on a rapid and dangerous retreat from the State. At daybreak on the morning of the 19th I moved from Waverly towards Lexington—General Shelby's division in the advance. Having received information that Generals Blunt, Lane and Jemmison, with between 3,000 and 4,000 Federals (Colorado, Kansas and Missouri Federal troops) were at Lexington, and fearing they might make a junction with McNeill and A. J. Smith, who were at Sedalia and Salt Fork, I made a flank movement to the left, after crossing Tabo, so as to intercept their line of march. The advance under Shelby met them at 2 P. M., and a battle immediately ensued. For a time the Federals fought well and resisted strenuously, but finally giving way, they were pressed by our troops, driven well past Lexington, and pursued on the road to Independence until night. That night the enemy evacuated Lexington in great haste and confusion. Shelby's old brigade, under Brigadier-General M. Jeff. Thompson, bivouacked that night in the suburbs of town. I encamped at General Shield's, three miles south of Lexington, marching that day twenty-six miles. On the morning of the 20th I moved west, in the same direction as before, to Five Creek prairie, twenty-two miles, where I encamped. Information was received that the enemy had fallen back to the Little Blue. On the 21st I resumed my line of march to the Little Blue on the Independence road—Marmaduke's division in the front, whose advance soon came upon the enemy's pickets, who, being driven across the Blue, burned the bridge as they crossed. A ford half a mile below the bridge was seized by our troops, and Marmaduke's division crossed it. His advance, Colonel Lawther's regiment, soon came upon the enemy, who were strongly posted behind a stone fence, in superior numbers. Lawther's regiment was driven back and hotly pursued by the foe, when they were reinforced by Colonel Green with one hundred and fifty men. A fierce engagement ensued, with varying success—Colonel Green contesting every inch of ground, when Wood's battery arrived and the enemy gave way; but being reinforced, again renewed the attack. Just as the ammunition of our troops engaged—who still manfully resisted with success the far superior numbers of the enemy—was about to become exhausted, Colonel Kitchen's regi-

ment arrived. Again the enemy was repulsed, and fell back to their former strong position. Hearing of the critical condition of General Marmaduke's division, I had sent orders for Shelby to move rapidly to his relief. He accordingly hastened with his division to the scene of action, and arrived there at the time the enemy had taken refuge in their first position; an attack was made upon them; a furious battle followed; the enemy was forced from his position and retreated. General Shelby now, taking the lead, drove them in a stubborn running fight on foot (his men having been dismounted) for two miles, and beyond Independence. For full particulars of this fight, reference is made to the reports of Generals Shelby and Clark, and to that of Colonel Green, accompanying the latter. In this action, General Marmaduke acted with distinguished gallantry, having not less than two horses shot under him. General Clark, of his division, also exhibited great skill and bravery, whilst Colonel Green, by the manner in which he handled his regiment against vastly superior forces, flushed with success, beating them back with his handful of men, contesting every inch of ground until assistance came, as well as by the personal courage exhibited by him, justly excited the admiration of his superior officers. Fagan's division, under my orders, supported General Shelby, but was not immediately engaged. Encamped that night in Independence—marching twenty-six miles, the troops being engaged most of the time.

On the evening of the 21st, Captain Williams, of Shelby's division, who had been sent on recruiting service, rejoined his command with six hundred men, capturing on his route the town of Carrollton with three hundred prisoners, and arming his entire command. On the morning of the 22d I left Independence. The enemy had fallen back to Big Blue on the Kansas City road, to a position strong by nature and strengthened by fortifications, upon which all their art had been expended; where they had been joined by General Curtis and his forces, thus increasing Blunt's army to between 6,000 and 8,000 men. Receiving this information, I determined to advance on the Santa Fe road, with Shelby's division in front, detaching Jackman and sending him on the Kansas City road to engage the enemy, then skirmishing with the pickets. General Shelby crossed the Big Blue with the remainder of his division, meeting some opposition from the enemy, which was soon overcome. After crossing, he engaged the enemy to cover the crossing and passage of the train. General Thompson with his brigade,

except Gordon's regiment, pressed the enemy to near the town of Westport, when he was ordered to fall back to the Blue. Colonel Gordon, with his regiment, who had been detained to guard the left, soon became engaged and was sorely pressed by overpowering numbers, when he was rejoined by Jackman, and gallantly charging they repulsed the enemy, pursued them some distance and inflicted heavy loss upon them; also captured a twenty-four pound howitzer. A large force of the enemy came out from Westport and a fight ensued, the enemy endeavoring to regain the lost gun. They were sternly resisted, and finally the arrival of General Thompson and night stopped the combat. Reference is made to the report of General Shelby by particulars. Two flags were also captured and presented to me on the battlefield by Captains McCoy and Wood, of Gordon's regiment, who had taken them with their own hands from the enemy. In the meantime other forces had engaged me in the rear. Having received information that other bodies of the enemy were pursuing me, I had directed pickets to be placed at the Little Blue to give notice of their approach. This had been done by General Fagan, and being advised on the morning of the 22d that the enemy had attacked and driven in his pickets, he dispatched General Cabell to drive back the enemy, which he did; but on his return, coming through Independence, the enemy struck Cabell in flank, cutting off three hundred or four hundred men and capturing two pieces of artillery. General Marmaduke's division, which formed the rear, became engaged with the same enemy half an hour before sundown. The division was then about two miles from Independence; the advance of the enemy was checked by our troops, who then fell back one half mile to a new position, which the enemy attacked with increasing fierceness, driving our troops steadily back until a late hour at night, and in almost impenetrable darkness.

For particulars, reference is made to the accompanying report of General Clark. I encamped that night on the battlefield near Westport, in line of battle, having marched twelve miles, the troops constantly engaging the enemy the whole distance. On the morning of the 23d I took up my line of march and soon discovered the enemy in position on the prairie. The train had been sent forward on the Fort Scott road. I had instructed General Marmaduke to resist the advance of the enemy, who was in his rear, if possible, as he was on the same road as the train. General Shelby immediately attacked the enemy, assisted by General Fagan, with two

brigades of Arkansas troops, and though they stubbornly resisted and contested every point of approach, drove them six or seven miles into Westport. In the meantime, General Marmaduke, who was to my right and rear, being attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy, had to fall back, after a most strenuous resistance—his ammunition being exhausted.

For full particulars, reference is made to the report of General Clark.

Being at that time near Westport, and in full view of Generals Fagan's and Shelby's commands, I received information that my train, which was in front and on the right of the Fort Scott road, was threatened by some two thousand or two thousand five hundred of the enemy, moving in a line parallel with the Fort Scott road. I immediately directed General Fagan and General Shelby to fall back to the train as soon as they could do so with safety, which I would attempt to defend until they arrived. I immediately pushed forward to the front of the train with my escort, and there formed in line of battle the unarmed men who were present to the number of several thousand; throwing my escort and all the armed men of Tyler's brigade forward as skirmishers—the whole not amounting to more than two hundred—to the front of the enemy, and directing General Cabell, who arrived soon after, to hold the crossing of the creek on my left, sending forward at the same time for a portion of Colonel McCroy's brigade, which was in advance of the train, and on his arrival found him in line of battle on the left flank of the enemy, which caused the enemy to fall back a considerable distance on the prairie. In the meantime, the rear and flank of the commands of Generals Fagan and Shelby, by the falling back of General Marmaduke, were uncovered, and the former, in attempting to rejoin me, was attacked by a large force of the enemy, but with the aid of Colonel Jackman and his brigade, who acted so heroically and skillfully as to receive the thanks of General Fagan on the field, the enemy was repulsed. General Shelby, in attempting to obey my instructions, was attacked in the flank, and his command thrown into some confusion, but he rallied, repulsed the enemy and joined me that evening, as did also General Fagan. Full details of this are contained in the accompanying reports of General Shelby and Colonel Jackman.

I encamped that night on the middle fork of Grand river, marching twenty-four miles—the troops having been engaged with the enemy nearly all day. The number of the enemy's troops engaged

that day exceeded 20,000 well-armed men, whilst I did not have 8,000 armed men.

On the evening of the 24th I moved with the command on the Fort Scott road to the Marais du Cygnus, where I encamped, having marched thirty-three miles—no enemy appearing. During the night I received information from General Marmaduke, who was placed in charge of the approaches in front, that the enemy was threatening his pickets; and upon consultation with General Marmaduke, we were both of the opinion that the enemy was marching upon our right by Mound City, on a road parallel to the one on which we were. We were strengthened in that belief by a dispatch which had been captured from the commanding officer (Federal) at that place to his scouts stationed near our then encampments, stating "that he would be largely reinforced that night, and he wanted a sharp lookout for my army, and he wanted the earliest information of the route on which I traveled and the direction." I also learned at a late hour that night, from some recruits who joined me and had traveled fifteen miles on the route I had come, that no enemy was in my rear.

On the morning of the 25th I resumed my march in the same direction as before, and thinking from the information received the night before that if I should encounter the enemy, it would be in my front or on my right flank.

General Shelby's division composed the advance; Generals Fagan and Marmaduke brought up the rear; Colonel Tyler's brigade to the right of the centre of the train, four hundred yards; Shelby's old brigade to the right of the front of the train, four hundred yards; and Colonel Jackman's brigade to the immediate front. On reaching Little Osage river I sent forward a direction to General Shelby to fall back to my position in rear of Jackman's brigade, for the purpose of attacking Fort Scott, where I learned there were one thousand negroes under arms. At the moment of his reaching me, I received a dispatch from General Marmaduke in the rear, informing me that the enemy, 3,000 strong, were in sight with lines extending, and on the note General Fagan had endorsed he would sustain General Marmaduke. I immediately ordered General Shelby to take his old brigade, then on my immediate right, and return to the rear as rapidly as possible to support Generals Fagan and Marmaduke. I mounted my horse and rode back at a gallop, and after passing the rear of the train I met the divisions of Generals Fagan and Marmaduke retreating in utter and indescribable

confusion, many of them having thrown away their arms. They were deaf to all entreaties or commands, and in vain were all efforts to rally them. From them I learned that Major-General Marmaduke, General Cabell and Colonel Slemmons, commanding brigade, had been captured, with three hundred or four hundred men, and all their artillery—five pieces. General Fagan and several of his officers, who then joined me, assisted me in trying to rally the armed men, without success. I then ordered General Shelby to hold the enemy (who were pressing their success hotly and fiercely) in check, if possible, at the crossing of the Osage until the train could be placed in safety—which he succeeded in doing for several hours. I again formed the unarmed men, numbering several thousand, in lines of battle on the prairie beyond the river. General Fagan in the meantime had succeeded in rallying a portion of his forces and assisted General Shelby in again holding the enemy in check upon the prairie and in front of the immense lines of unarmed men until night, when I withdrew. The train having reached the Marmiton, ten miles, I then overtook it, having marched twenty-eight miles. On the next morning, after destroying many wagons, with broken-down teams that could not be replaced, I moved at two o'clock, there being but little forage in the neighborhood of my camp. We marched over beautiful prairie roads fifty-six miles and encamped at Carthage, on Spring river, the nearest point where forage could be procured, as I was informed by Generals Fagan and Shelby, who earnestly desired me to reach Spring river, as no forage could be obtained short of it. The Federal prisoners I had with me became so much exhausted by fatigue that, out of humanity, I paroled them. For full report of this action, see the several reports of Generals Shelby and Clark, and other accompanying reports.

On the next morning at 9 o'clock, after giving the men and animals time to rest and feed, I resumed the march and camped on Shoal creek, twenty-two miles. During the march a number of desertions took place among the Arkansas troops and recruits. No enemy having appeared, the morale of the troops had much improved.

On the 28th I marched towards Newtonia—Generals Fagan and Marmaduke's divisions, the latter now commanded by General Clark, in the rear, and General Shelby's in the advance. On approaching Newtonia our advance was discovered by the Federal garrison, who commenced to retreat. On seeing this Shelby's ad-

vance attempted to intercept them—the distance they had gained was too great for this to be effected. They succeeded, however, in killing the Federal Captain Christian, a notorious “bushwhacker,” noted for his deeds of violence and blood.

After passing over the prairie four miles beyond Newtonia, General Shelby encamped in a skirt of timber; the other divisions passed beyond and encamped in the positions they were to take in the march of the following day. Ere long our scouts brought information that the enemy was crossing the prairie in pursuit of us. Preparations were at once made to receive him, and at 3 P. M., General Blunt, with 3,000 cavalry, made a furious onslaught on our lines. He was met by Shelby, supported by a portion of Fagan’s command. A short but obstinate fight ensued, when General Blunt was repulsed and driven three miles, with heavy loss. This was the last we saw of the enemy. For full particulars, see General Shelby’s report.

The army marched that day twenty-six miles. On the 29th we marched twenty-six miles and encamped on Sugar creek, five miles south of Pineville, passing through that town. On the 30th and 31st we reached Maysville, near the Arkansas line, marching forty-three miles. November 1st we reached Boonsboro’, or Cane Hill, as it is commonly termed, marching seventeen miles. Then information was received by General Fagan from Colonel Brooks that he had the town of Fayetteville, Arkansas, closely invested, having forced the garrison within their inner fortifications, and asking for men to enable him to take it. As this was a place of importance to the Federals, and its capture would be of great advantage to the cause, upon General Fagan’s earnest solicitation, I ordered a detail of five hundred men and two guns to be made to him for that purpose, which was furnished by General Shelby, under command of Colonel Elliott—the guns from Collins’ battery. The expedition started to Fayetteville, formed a junction with Colonel Brooks, but before the place could be taken, the approach of General Blunt, with a large cavalry force, caused the siege to be raised, and Colonel Elliott rejoined his command. Our march from Illinois river to Cane Hill was over a bad road, rough and hilly, rendered worse than usual by constant rain; in consequence, much of the stock became worn out and was abandoned on the route. On the 3d I remained in camp; the weather very bad, both snowing and raining during the day. I there received information that the Federals at Little Rock had been greatly reinforced by a portion of

General Canby's command; and as it was necessary that I should here adopt the line of march I should pursue on my return to Arkansas, to district headquarters, or elsewhere, as I should be directed, I determined not to risk the crossing of the Arkansas river between Fort Smith and Little Rock, on which route I could not procure subsistence, forage or grass in anything like sufficient quantity; but decided to cross through the Indian country, where beef at least could be obtained, which would subsist my men for the few days it would require them to march until they would meet supplies, even if no salt or breadstuffs could be procured, whilst some grass could be obtained for the animals. In addition, the route across the Arkansas river below Fort Smith would be over a hilly and mountainous country—that the stock, in its present condition, would be unable to travel over—whilst through the Indian country it would be over level plains, traversed by good roads. Again, by taking the route below Fort Smith I would expose my army to be destroyed by a joint attack from forces detached from the heavy garrison there, acting with large forces from Little Rock, which could be easily spared, and which would, in all probability, take place, as information of my adopting that route would certainly reach them, and the slowness with which I was compelled to move would give them ample time to make all preparations. I furthermore came to this conclusion from the fact that it coincided with my instructions—in the propriety of which my own judgment fully concurred. Colonels Freeman, Dobbins and McCroy were ordered to return, with such of their men as still remained with their colors, to the places where they had raised their commands, to collect the absentees, and bring them within our lines during December, if possible; and on the 4th of November I marched with the balance of my command through the Indian territory in the direction of Boggy depot. On the 13th I reached Perryville—a distance of one hundred and nineteen miles—when I met three wagons with supplies and encamped, remaining one day to rest and recruit my men. I had marched carefully and slowly, stopping to graze my stock whenever an opportunity offered. On the 14th, General Shelby, at his request, was left behind on the Canadian to recruit. On the 20th, Cabell's and Slemmons' brigades were furloughed. On the 21st of November I arrived at Clarks-ville, where I received an order from General Magruder to march to Lanesport and there establish my headquarters. I arrived there on the 2d of December, having marched 1,434 miles. The march

through the Indian country was necessarily a severe one, especially upon the stock, many of which died or became worn out and were left. The men, in some instances, hungered for food, but never approached starvation, nor did they suffer to the extent that other of our soldiers have cheerfully endured without complaint for a much longer time during the war. At all events, I arrived in the country where food and forage could be obtained in abundance, bringing with me all the sick and wounded and all my command with which I entered the Indian country, except those who voluntarily straggled and deserted their colors. To enumerate specially the names of the officers who distinguished themselves for skill and courage would swell this report beyond all reasonable limits. Therefore, as to all but general officers and those who acted in that capacity, I must simply refer to the accompanying reports, heartily concurring in the meed of praise awarded to such officers as are thus enumerated by their immediate commanding officers.

General Fagan, commanding the division of Arkansas troops, bore himself throughout the whole expedition with unabated gallantry and ardor, and commanded his division with great ability.

General J. S. Marmaduke, commanding the division of Mississippi troops, proved himself worthy of his past reputation as a valiant and skillful officer, and rendered with his division great service. His capture was a great loss to the service.

General J. O. Shelby, commanding the division of Missouri troops, added new lustre to his past fame as a brilliant and heroic soldier, and, without disparagement to the other officers, I must be permitted to say that I consider him the best cavalry officer I ever saw. The services rendered by him and his division in this expedition are beyond all praise.

General Cabell bore himself as a bold, undaunted, skillful officer. Impetuous, yet wary, he commanded his brigade in such a manner as to win praise from all. I regret that from want of reports from their several commanding officers, I cannot do justice to this as well as the other brigades of Arkansas troops. General Cabell's capture was a great misfortune, and his place will be difficult to fill.

General Clark, true to his past fame, bore himself with undaunted courage and bravery, as well as skill and prudence. His brigade was most skillfully handled.

Colonels Slemmons, Dobbins and McCroy (the first of whom was

captured) acted throughout as brave, daring, yet prudent commanders and are each entitled to great praise.

Colonel Jackman, through the whole expedition, won for himself great honor for the services he rendered, as have been herein enumerated, and for which the whole army awarded him the highest praise.

Colonel Freeman proved himself to be a brave and energetic officer, but as his men were mostly unarmed they were unable to render the same brilliant services as other brigades that were armed.

Colonel Tyler, who was placed in command of a brigade of new recruits, for the most part unarmed, deserves great praise for the success with which he kept them together and brought them within our lines. He deserves especial mention for the cool gallantry he displayed in charging the enemy with them at an important juncture, thereby greatly aiding in saving the train from destruction.

My thanks are due to my staff officers for their untiring energy and unremitting attention to their duties during the entire campaign; their zeal and devotion cannot be too highly commended by me.

In conclusion, permit me to say that in my opinion the results flowing from my operations in Missouri are of the most gratifying character. I marched 1,434 miles, fought forty-three battles and skirmishes, captured and paroled over three thousand officers and men, captured eighteen pieces of artillery, three thousand stand of small arms, sixteen stand of colors (brought out by me, besides others destroyed by our troops who took them), at least three thousand overcoats, large quantities of blankets, shoes and clothing, many wagons and teams, numbers of horses and great quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores. I destroyed miles upon miles of railroad, burning depots and bridges. Taking this into the calculation I do not think I go beyond the truth in saying that I destroyed in the late expedition to Missouri \$10,000,000 worth of property. On the other hand, I lost ten pieces of artillery, two stand of colors, one thousand stand of small arms, whilst I don't think I lost over one thousand prisoners, including the wounded left in their hands, other than recruits on their way to join me, some of whom may have been captured. I brought out with me over five thousand recruits, and they are still arriving daily. After I passed the German settlements in Missouri, my march was an ovation; the people thronged around and welcomed us with open hearts and hands. Recruits flocked to our flag in such numbers as to

threaten to become a burden instead of a benefit, being mostly unarmed. In some counties the question was not who should go to the army, but who should stay at home. I am satisfied that could I have remained in Missouri this winter the army would have increased fifty thousand men.

My thanks are due Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, my Provost Marshal-General, for the able, energetic and efficient discharge of his duties.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

STIRLING PRICE, *Major-General Commanding.*

Instructions to Hon. James M. Mason—Letter from Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, Secretary of State, C. S. A.

[The following letter has never been published, so far as we are aware, and will be read with pleasure as an important link in the history of the Confederacy.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
RICHMOND, September 23, 1861.

To the Honorable JAMES M. MASON, *Etc., Etc.:*

Sir—The President desires that you should proceed to London with as little delay as possible, and place yourself, as soon as you may be able to do so, in communication with the Government. The events which have occurred since our commissioners had their first interview with Lord John Russell have placed our claims to recognition in a much stronger point of view; but in presenting the case once more to the British Government, you ought again to explain the true position in which we appear before the world. We are not to be viewed as revolted provinces or rebellious subjects, seeking to overthrow the lawful authority of a common sovereign. Neither are we warring for rights of a doubtful character, or such as are to be ascertained only by implication. On the contrary, the Union from which we have withdrawn was founded upon the express stipulations of a written instrument which established a government whose powers were to be exercised for certain declared purposes and restricted within well defined limits. When a sectional and dominant majority persistently violated the covenants and condi-

tions of that compact, those States whose safety and well-being depended upon the performance of these covenants were justly absolved from all moral obligation to remain in such a Union. And when the government of that Union, instead of affording protection to their social system, itself threatened not merely to disturb the peace and the security of its people, but also to destroy their social system, the States thus menaced owed it to themselves and their posterity to withdraw immediately from a Union whose very bonds prevented them from defending themselves against such dangers. Such were the causes which led the Confederate States to form a new Union, to be composed of more homogeneous materials and interests. Experience had demonstrated to them that a union of two different and hostile social systems under a Government in which one of them wielded nearly all the power, was not only ill-assorted, but dangerous in the extreme to the weaker section whose scheme of society was thus unprotected.

Prompted by these teachings, eleven sovereign States, bound together by the tie of a common social system and by the sympathies of identical interests, have instituted a new Confederacy and a new Government, which they justly hope will be more harmonizing in its operation and more permanent in its existence. In forming this Government they seek to preserve their old institutions and to pursue through their new organic law the very ends and purposes for which, as they believe, the first was formed. It was because a revolution was sought to be made in the spirit and ends of the organic law of their first union by a dominant and sectional majority, operating through the machinery of a government which was in their hands and placed there for different purposes, that the Confederate States withdrew themselves from the jurisdiction of such a government and established another for themselves. Their example, therefore, furnishes no precedent for the overthrow of the lawful authority of a regular government by revolutionary violence, nor does it encourage a resort to factious tumult and civil war by irresponsible bodies of men. On the contrary, their union has been formed through the regular action of the sovereign States composing the Confederacy, and it has established a government competent to the discharge of all its civil functions and entirely responsible, both in war and peace, for all its actions. Nor has that Government shown itself unmindful of the obligation which its people incurred whilst their States were members of the former union. On the contrary, one of their first

acts was to send commissioners to the Government at Washington to adjust amicably all subjects of difference and to provide for a peaceable separation and a fair satisfaction of the mutual claims of the two Confederacies. These commissioners were not received, and all offers for a peaceful accommodation were contemptuously rejected. The authority of our Government itself was denied, its people denounced as rebels, and a war was waged against them, which, if carried on in the spirit it was proclaimed, must be the most sanguinary and barbarous which has been known for centuries among civilized people. The Confederate States have thus been forced to take up arms in defence of their right to self-government, and in the name of that sacred right they have appealed to the nations of the earth, not for material aid or alliances, offensive and defensive, but for the moral weight which they would derive from holding a recognized place as a free and independent people. In asking for this they feel that they will not receive more than they will give in return, and they offer, as they think, a full equivalent for any favor that may thus be granted them. Diplomatic relations are established mainly to protect human intercourse and to adjust peaceably the differences which spring from such intercourse or arise out of the conflicting interests of society. The advantages of such an intercourse are mutual, and in general, as between nations, any one of them receives as much as it gives, to say nothing of the well being of human society which is promoted by placing its relations under the protection and restraints of public law. It would seem, then, that a new Confederacy asking to establish diplomatic relations with the world ought not to be required to do more than to present itself through a government competent to discharge its civil functions and strong enough to be responsible for its actions to the other nations of the earth. After this is shown, the great interests of peace and the general good of society would seem to require that a speedy recognition should follow. It cannot be difficult to show in our case a strict compliance with these, the just conditions of our recognition as an independent people. If we were pleading for favors we might ask and find more than one precedent in British history for granting the request that we be recognized for the sake of that sacred right of self-government for which we are this day in arms, and which we have been taught to prize by the teachings, the traditions and the example of the race from which we have sprung. But we do not place ourselves before the bar of nations to ask for favors; we seek for what we believe to

be justice not only to ourselves, but justice to the great interests of peace and humanity. If the recognition of our independence must finally come and if it be only a work of time, it seems to be the duty of each of the nations of the earth to throw the moral weight of its recognition into the scale of peace as soon as possible. For, to delay, will only be to prolong unnecessarily the sufferings of war. If then our Government can be shown to be such as has been here described, we shall place ourselves in the position of a people who are entitled to a recognition of their independence. The physical and moral elements of our Confederacy, its great, but undeveloped capacities, and its developed strength as proved by the history of the conflict in which we are now engaged, ought to satisfy the world of the responsible character of the Government of the Confederate States. The eleven States now confederated together cover seven hundred and thirty-three thousand one hundred and forty-four square miles of territory and embrace nine millions two hundred and forty-four thousand people. This territory, large enough to become the seat of an immense power, embraces not only all the best varieties of climate and production known to the temperate zone, but also the great staples of cotton, tobacco, sugar and rice. It teems with the resources, both moral and physical, of a great empire, and nothing is wanted but time and peace for their development. To these States there will probably be added hereafter Maryland, Missouri and Kentucky, whose interests and sympathies must bind them to the South. If these are added, the Confederate States will embrace eight hundred and fifty thousand square miles of territory and twelve and a half millions of people, to say nothing of the once common Territories west of these States, which will probably fall into the new Confederacy. Is it to be supposed that such a people and with such resources can be subdued in war when subjugation is to be followed by such consequences as would result from their conquest? If such a supposition prevails anywhere, it can find no countenance in the history of the contest in which we are now engaged. In the commencement of this struggle, our enemies had in their possession the machinery of the old Government. The naval, and, for the most part, the military establishments, were in their hands. They had, too, most of the accumulated capital and nearly all the manufacturing of arms, ordnance and of the necessities of life. They had all the means of striking us hard blows before we could be ready to return them. And yet in the face of all this we have insti-

tuted a government and placed more than 200,000 men in the field with an adequate staff and commissariat. A still larger number of men are ready to take the field if it should become necessary, and experience has shown that the only limit to the disposition of the people to give what may be required for the war is to be found in their ability. The enemy, with greatly superior numbers, have been routed in pitched battles at Bethel and Manassas in Virginia, and their recent defeat at Springfield, Missouri, was almost as signal as that of Manassas. The comparatively little foothold which they have had in the Confederate States is gradually being lost, and after six months of war, in which they employed their best resources, it may truly be said they are much further from the conquest of the Southern States than they seemed to be when the struggle commenced. The Union feeling which was supposed to exist largely in the South, and which was known to us to be imaginary, is now shown in the true light to all mankind. Never were any people more united than are those of the Confederate States in their purpose to maintain their independence at any cost of life and treasure, nor is there a party to be found anywhere in these States which professes a desire for a reunion with the United States. Nothing could prove this unanimity of feeling more strongly than the fact that this immense army may be said to have taken the field spontaneously and faster almost than the Government could provide for its organization and equipment. But the voluntary contributions of the people supplied all deficiencies until the Government could come to their assistance, as it has done, with the necessary military establishments. And what is perhaps equally remarkable, it may be said with truth, that there has been no judicial execution for a political offence during the whole of the war, and so far as military offences are concerned our prisons would be empty if it were not for a few captured spies. Under these circumstances it would seem that the time has arrived when it would be proper in the Government of Great Britain to recognize our independence. If it be obvious that the Confederate States cannot be conquered in this struggle, then the sooner the strife be ended the better for the cause of peace and the interests of mankind. Under such circumstances, to fail to throw the great moral influence of such a recognition into the scale of peace, when this may be done without risk or danger, may be to share in the responsibility for the longer continuance of an unnecessary war. This is a consideration which ought, perhaps, to have some weight.

with a nation which leads so largely, as does that of Great Britain, in the progress of Christian civilization. That the British people have a deep political and commercial interest in the establishment of the independence of the Confederate States must be obvious to all. Their real interest in that event is only a little less than our own. The great question of cotton supply, which has occupied their attention so justly and so anxiously for some years past, will then be satisfactorily settled. Whilst the main source of cotton production was in the hands of such a power as that of the late United States and controlled by those who were disposed to use that control to acquire the supremacy in navigation, commerce and manufactures over all rivals, there was just cause for anxiety on the part of nations who were largely dependent upon this source of supply for the raw material of important manufactures. But the case will be far different when peace is conquered and the independence of the Confederate States is acknowledged. Within these States must be found for years to come the great source of cotton supply. So favorable a combination of soil, climate and labor is nowhere else to be found. Their capacity for increased production has so far kept pace with the increased demand, and in time of peace it promises to do so for a long while to come. In the question of the supply of this great staple there is a world-wide interest, and if the nations of the earth could choose for themselves a single depository for such an interest, perhaps none could be found to act so impartially in that capacity as the Confederacy of Southern States. Their great interest is and will be, for a long time to come, in the production and exportation of the important staples so much sought by the rest of the world. It would be long before they would become the rivals of those who are largely concerned in navigation, manufactures and commerce. On the contrary, these interests would make them valuable customers and bind them to the policy of free trade. Their early legislation, which has thrown open their navigation, foreign and coasting, to the free competition of all nations, and which has imposed the lowest duties on imports consistent with their necessary revenue wants, proves the natural tendency of their commercial policy. Under such circumstances, the supply of cotton to Great Britain would be as abundant, as cheap and as certain as if these States were themselves her colonies. The establishment of such an empire, committed, as it would be, to the policy of free trade by its interests and traditions, would seem to be a matter of primary importance to the progress of

human industry and the great cause of human civilization. It would be of the deepest interest to such a government to preserve peace, and to improve its opportunities for the pursuit of the useful arts. The residue of the world would find here, too, sources of supply of more than one of the great staples in which manufactures and commerce are most deeply interested, and these sources would probably prove to be not only constant, as being little likely to be troubled by the chances of war, but also of easy access to all who might desire to resort to them. In presenting the great importance of this question to the Government of Great Britain in its connection with their material interests, you will not omit its bearing upon the future political relations between the old and the new world. With a balance of power established between the great Confederacies on the North American continent, the fears of a disturbance of the peace of the world from the desire for the annexation of contiguous territory on the part of a vast and overshadowing political and military organization will be dissipated. Under the former Union the slaveholding States had an interest in the acquisition of territory suitable to their institutions in order to establish a balance of power within the Government for their own protection. This reason no longer exists, as the Confederate States have sought that protection by a separation from the Union in which their rights were endangered. It is manifest from the nature of its interests that the Southern Confederacy in entering as a new member in the family of nations would exercise not a disturbing but a harmonizing influence on human society, for it would not only desire peace itself, but to some extent become a bond of peace amongst others. In offering these views to the Government of Great Britain, you will be able to say with truth that you present a case precisely and entirely within the principles upon which it has acted since 1821,—principles so well stated by Lord John Russell in his dispatches upon the Italian question that they can not be better defined than in his own words. In his letter to Lord Cowley, of the 15th November, 1859, after adverting to the action of Great Britain in 1821 in regard to the declarations of the Congresses of Troppan and Laybach; in 1823 in regard to the Congress of Verona, and in 1825, 1827 and 1830 in the cases of the South American Republics, of Greece and of Belgium, he says: "Thus in these five instances the policy of Great Britain appears to have been directed by a consistent principle. She uniformly withheld her consent to acts of intervention by force to alter the internal

government of other nations; she uniformly gave her countenance, and if necessary her aid, to consolidate the de facto governments which arose in Europe or America." To recognize the Confederate States as an independent power would be to give her countenance to consolidate a de facto government in America which is already supported by a force strong enough to defend it against all probable assaults. To withhold that recognition would certainly encourage the armed intervention of a government, now foreign to us, for the purpose of altering the internal government of the Confederate States of America. In his letter of December 3d, 1859, to Lord A. Loftus, in regard to the controversy between Austria and her provinces, he says: "We, at least, are convinced that an authority restored by force of arms constantly opposed by the national wishes would afford no solid and durable basis for the pacification and welfare of Italy." Is not this sentiment still more applicable to the contest now being waged between the United States and the Confederate States? Again, in his dispatch of November 26th, 1859, to Earl Cowley, he declared that "It would be an invidious task to discuss the reasons which, in the view of the people of Central Italy, justified their acts. It will be sufficient to say that since the peace of 1815 Her Majesty's predecessors have recognized the separation of the Spanish Colonies in South America from Spain; of Greece, from the dominion of the Sultan; and of Belgium from Holland. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the reasons adduced in favor of these separations were not stronger than those which have been alleged at Florence, Parma, Modena and Bologna in justification of the course the people of those States have pursued." Were the reasons "alleged" in the States of Florence, Parma, Modena and Bologna, whose people are thus assumed to be the judges in a matter so nearly touching their happiness as their internal government, at all stronger than those "alleged" by the people of the eleven sovereign States now confederated together for withdrawing from a Union formed by a voluntary compact upon conditions which were persistently violated and with covenants essential to their domestic repose openly threatened to be broken? But appended to this letter of instructions you will find more extended extracts from the letters here referred to, for your especial reference. There is yet another question of great practical importance to us and to the world, which you will present on the first proper occasion to Her Britannic Majesty's Government. It was declared by the five great powers at the Con-

ference of Paris that "blockades to be binding must be effectual." A principle long since sanctioned by leading publicists and now acknowledged by nearly all civilized nations. You will be furnished with abundant evidence of the fact that the blockade of the coasts of the Confederate States has not been effectual or of such a character as to be binding according to the declaration of the Conference at Paris. Such being the case, it may, perhaps, be fairly urged that the five great powers owe it to their own consistency and to the world to make good a declaration thus solemnly made. Propositions of such gravity and emanating from sources so high may fairly be considered as affecting the general business relations of human society and as controlling, in a great degree, the calculations and arrangements of nations, so far as they are concerned, in the rules thus laid down. Men have a right to presume that a law thus proclaimed will be universally maintained by those who have the power to do so and who have taken it upon themselves to watch over its execution, nor will any suppose that particular States or cases would be exempted from its operation under the influence of partiality or favor. If, therefore, we can prove the blockade to have been ineffectual, we, perhaps, have a right to expect that the nations assenting to this declaration of the Conference at Paris will not consider it to be binding. We are fortified in this expectation, not only by their own declarations, but by the nature of the interests affected by the blockade. So far, at least, it has been proved that the only certain and sufficient source of cotton supply has been found in the Confederate States. It is probable that there are more people without than within the Confederate States who derive their means of living from the various uses which are made of this important staple. A war, therefore, which shuts up this great source of supply from the general uses of mankind is directed as much against those who transport and manufacture cotton as against those who produce the raw material. Innocent parties, who are thus affected, insist that a right, whose exercise operates so unfavorably on them, shall only be used within the strictest limits of public law. Would it not be a movement more in consonance with the spirit of the age to insist that amongst the many efficient means of waging war, this one should be excepted in deference to the general interests of mankind, so many of whom depend for their means of living upon a ready and easy access to the greatest and cheapest cotton market in the world? If, for the general benefit of commerce, some of its great routes have been neutralized so

as to be unaffected by the chances of war, might not another interest of a greater and more world-wide importance claim at least so much consideration as to demand the benefit of every presumption in favor of its protection against all the chances of war, save those which arise under the strictest rules of public law? This is a question of almost as much interest to the world at large as it is to the Confederate States. No belligerent can claim the right thus to injure innocent parties by such a blockade, except to the extent that it can be shown to furnish the legitimate, or perhaps we might go still further and say the necessary, means to prosecute the war successfully. If it has become obvious, as would now seem to be the case, that no blockade which they can maintain will enable the United States to subdue the Confederate States of America, upon what plea can its further continuance be justified to third parties, who are so deeply interested in a ready and easy access to the cheapest and most abundant sources of cotton supply. Perhaps we had the right to expect, inasmuch as by the proclamation of Her Britannic Majesty neutrality had been declared as between the belligerents, that one of the parties would not have been allowed to close the ports of the other by a mere proclamation of blockade without an adequate force to sustain it. In presenting the various views contained in this letter of instructions, you will say that they are offered as much in the general interests of mankind as in our own. We do not ask for assistance to enable us to maintain our independence against any power which has yet assailed us. The President of the Confederate States believes that he cannot be mistaken in supposing it to be the duty of the nations of the earth by a prompt recognition to throw the weight of their moral influence against the unnecessary prolongation of the war. Whether the case now presented be one for such action, he is perhaps not the most impartial judge. He has discharged his duty to other nations when he has presented to their knowledge the facts to which their only sure access is through himself, in such a manner as will enable them to acquit themselves of their responsibilities to the world according to their own sense of right. But whilst he neither feels nor affects an indifference to the decision of the world upon these questions which deeply concern the interests of the Confederate States, he does not present their claim to a recognized place amongst the nations of the earth from the belief that any such recognition is necessary to enable them to achieve and secure their independence. Such an act might diminish the

sufferings and shorten the duration of an unnecessary war, but with or without it he believes that the Confederate States, under the guidance of a kind and overruling Providence, will make good their title to freedom and independence and to a recognized place amongst the nations of the earth. When you are officially recognized by the British Government, and diplomatic relations between the two countries are thus fully established, you will request an audience of Her Majesty, for the purpose of presenting your letters accrediting you as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Confederate States near Her Majesty, and in that capacity you are empowered to negotiate such treaties as the mutual interests of both countries may require, subject of course to the approval of the President and the co-ordinate branch of the treaty-making power.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

R. M. T. HUNTER.

The Gettysburg Campaign.

We propose, from time to time, to add to our "Gettysburg series" such reports as have never been published and are important in completing the Confederate account of that great battle.

We are quite sure our readers generally will thank us for giving this week the reports of the chivalric Georgian and the gallant Carolinian who both won military fame which has been only eclipsed by their splendid "victories of peace," and who now sit together in the Senate chamber at Washington.

Report of Brigadier-General John B. Gordon.

HEADQUARTERS GORDON'S BRIGADE, August 10th, 1863.

To Major JOHN W. DANIEL, A. A. G., *Early's Division* :

Major—I have the honor to report that my brigade began the march with Early's division from Hamilton's crossing on the 4th of June last. Halting at Culpeper Courthouse two days, on the night of the 12th, after a most exhausting march of seventeen miles in about six hours, we reached Front Royal. I was ordered to move on the pike leading to Winchester at three o'clock A. M.,

13th of June. Forging both branches of the Shenandoah, we marched to a point on the Staunton pike, about five and one half miles from Winchester, when, as ordered by Major-General Early, I moved to the left of this road and formed line of battle three miles southwest of the town. About four o'clock in the afternoon I deployed a line of skirmishers and moved forward to the attack, holding two regiments (the Thirteenth and Thirty-first Georgia) in reserve. After advancing several hundred yards, I found it necessary to bring into line these two regiments—the Thirty-first on the right and the Thirteenth on the left. The enemy's skirmishers retreated on his battle line, a portion of which occupied a strong position behind a stone wall, but from which he was immediately driven. A battery, which I had hoped to capture, was rapidly withdrawn.

In this charge, which was executed with spirit and unchecked at any point, my brigade lost seventy-five men, including some efficient officers.

On the 14th, detachments from this brigade were engaged in skirmishing with the enemy in front of the town and fort. In accordance with orders from Major-General Early, received in the night of the 14th, I began to move my brigade upon the fort at daylight the following morning. I soon discovered that the fort was evacuated, and sending a detachment to occupy it and take possession of the garrison flag, I sent an officer to communicate with the Major-General and moved as rapidly as possible in the direction of the firing distinctly heard on the Martinsburg pike.

My brigade reached the point where a portion of Johnson's division engaged the retreating enemy only in time to assist in collecting horses and prisoners.

Crossing the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 22d of June, we marched through Boonsboro', Maryland, to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Before reaching this place my brigade was detached by Major-General Early from the division and ordered on a different road, with a battalion of cavalry under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel White.

In front of Gettysburg a regiment of Pennsylvania militia was charged and routed by this cavalry battalion. I was here ordered to move on the direct pike to the city of York. Before entering this place, the Mayor and a deputation of citizens were sent out by the city authorities to make a formal surrender. In accordance with prior instructions from Major-General Early, I moved directly through, having sent in front of the brigade a provost-guard to occupy the city and take down the Federal flag, left flying over the principal street. We moved by the direct pike to Wrightsville on the Susquehanna. At this point I found a body of Pennsylvania militia, nearly equal in number to my brigade, reported by the commanding officer, whom we captured, at twelve hundred men, strongly entrenched, but without artillery. A line of skirmishers was sent to make a demonstration in front of these works, while I moved to the right by a circuitous route with three regiments, in

order to turn these works, and, if possible, gain the enemy's rear, cut off his retreat and seize the bridge. This I found impracticable, and placing in position the battery under my command, opened on the works, and by a few well aimed shots and the advance of my lines, caused this force to retreat precipitately, with the loss of about twenty prisoners, including one lieutenant-colonel. I had no means of ascertaining the enemy's number of killed and wounded. One dead man was left on the field. Our loss, *one* wounded. It may not be improper in this connection, as evidence of the base ingratitude of our enemies, to state that the Yankee press has attributed to my brigade the burning of the town of Wrightsville. In his retreat across the bridge, the enemy fired it about midway with the most inflammable materials. Every effort was made to extinguish this fire and save the bridge, but it was impossible. From this the town was fired, and notwithstanding the excessive fatigue of the men, from the march of twenty-nine miles and the skirmish with the enemy, I formed my brigade in line around the burning buildings and resisted the progress of the flames until they were checked.

Leaving Wrightsville on the morning of the 29th, I sent the cavalry under my command to burn all the bridges (fourteen in number) on the railroad leading to York, to which place I marched my brigade and rejoined the division, from which we had been separated since June 26th. Marching thence to Gettysburg, we participated in the battle of July 1st. In accordance with orders from Major-General Early, I formed my brigade in line of battle on the right of the division—one regiment, the Twenty-sixth Georgia, having been detached to support the artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones.

About 3 o'clock P. M. I was ordered to move my brigade forward to the support of Major-General Rodes' left. The men were much fatigued from long marches, and I therefore caused them to move forward slowly, until within about three hundred yards of the enemy's line, when the advance was as rapid as the nature of the ground and a proper regard for the preservation of my alignment would permit.

The enemy had succeeded in gaining a position upon the left flank of Doles' brigade, and in causing these troops to retreat. This movement of the enemy would necessarily have exposed his right flank but for the precaution he had taken to cover it by another line. It was upon this line, drawn up in a strong position on the crest of a hill, a portion of which was woodland, that my brigade charged. Moving forward under heavy fire over rail and plank fences, and crossing a creek whose banks were so abrupt as to prevent a passage except at certain points, this brigade rushed upon the enemy with a resolution and spirit, in my opinion, rarely equaled.

The enemy made a most obstinate resistance, until the colors on portions of the two lines were separated by a space of less than fifty paces, when his line was broken and driven back, leaving the

flank which this line had protected exposed to the fire from my brigade. An effort was here made by the enemy to change his front and check our advance, but the effort failed, and this line too was driven back in the greatest confusion and with immense loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. Among the latter was a division commander (General Barlow), who was severely wounded. I was here ordered by Major-General Early to halt.

I had no means of ascertaining the number of the enemy's wounded by the fire of this brigade, but if these were in the usual proportion to his killed, nearly three hundred of whom were buried on the ground where my brigade fought, his loss in killed and wounded must have exceeded the number of men I carried into action.

Neither was it possible for me to take any account of the prisoners sent to the rear. But the division inspector credits this brigade with about eighteen hundred. I carried into action about twelve hundred men, one regiment having been detached as above stated. The loss of the brigade in killed and wounded was three hundred and fifty—forty of whom were killed.

The movements during the succeeding days of the battle (July 2d and 3d) I do not consider of sufficient importance to mention. In the afternoon of July 5th, on the retreat from Gettysburg, my brigade, acting as rear guard, was pressed by the enemy near Fairfield, Virginia. I was ordered by Major-General Early to hold him in check until the wagon and division trains could be moved forward. Detaching one regiment (the Twenty-sixth Georgia) I deployed it, and after a spirited skirmish succeeded in driving back the enemy's advance guard and in withdrawing this regiment through the woods, with the loss of eight or ten killed and wounded.

On the 14th of July this brigade, with the division, recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport.

It would be gratifying, and in accordance with my sense of justice, to mention the acts of individual courage which came under my own observation and which have been reported to me, but as the exhibition of this virtue was the general rule, I should do injustice to many if I attempted it.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. GORDON, *Brigadier-General.*

Report of Brigadier-General Wade Hampton.

COLUMBIA, August 13, 1863.

Major McCLELLAN, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

Major—I avail myself of the first opportunity at which I am able to do so to send in a report of the part taken by my brigade during the battle of Gettysburg. The previous operations of the brigade shall be embodied in a subsequent report as soon as I am well enough to make it out. I send the present report, as I deem it important that it should go in at the earliest moment.

The brigade was stationed, on the 2d of July, at Hunterstown, five miles to the east of Gettysburg, where orders came from General Stuart that it should move up and take position on the left of our infantry. Before this could be accomplished, I was notified that a heavy force of cavalry was advancing on Hunterstown, with a view to get in the rear of our army. Communicating this information to General Stuart, I was ordered by him to return and hold the enemy in check. Pursuant to these orders, I moved back and met the enemy between Hunterstown and Gettysburg. After skirmishing a short time he attempted a charge, which was met in front by the Cobb legion, whilst I threw the Phillips legion and the Second South Carolina as supporting forces on each flank of the enemy. The charge was most gallantly made, and the enemy were driven back in confusion to the support of his sharpshooters and artillery, both of which opened on me heavily. I had no artillery at this time, but soon after two pieces were sent to me and they did good service. Night coming on, I held the ground until morning, when I found that the enemy had retreated from Hunterstown, leaving some of his wounded officers and men in the village.

The Cobb legion, which led in this gallant charge, suffered quite severely. Lieutenant-Colonel Delaney and several other officers being wounded, whilst the regiment lost in killed quite a number of brave officers and men, whose names I regret not being able to give. On the morning of the 3d July I was ordered to move through Hunterstown and endeavor to get on the right flank of the enemy. In accordance with these orders the brigade passed through the village just named, across the railroad and thence south till we discovered the enemy.

I took position on the left of Colonel Chambliss, and threw out sharpshooters to check an advance the enemy were attempting. Soon after, General Fitz. Lee came up and took position on my left. The sharpshooters soon became actively engaged, and succeeded perfectly in keeping the enemy back, whilst the three brigades were held ready to meet any charge made by the enemy. We had, for the three brigades, but two pieces of artillery, whilst the enemy had apparently two batteries in position. In the afternoon, about four and a half o'clock I should think, an order came from General

Stuart for General Fitz. Lee and myself to report to him, leaving our brigades where they were. Thinking that it would not be proper for both of us to leave the ground at the same time, I told General Lee that I would go to General Stuart first and on my return he could go. Leaving General Lee, I rode off to see General Stuart, but could not find him. On my return to the field, I saw my brigade in motion, having been ordered to charge by General Lee. This order I countermanded, as I did not think it a judicious one, and the brigade assumed its former position—not, however, without loss, as the movement had disclosed its position to the enemy. A short time after this, an officer from Chambliss reported to me that he had been sent to ask support from General Lee, but he had replied my brigade was nearest and should support Chambliss' brigade. Seeing that support was essential, I sent to Colonel Baker, ordering him to send *two* regiments to protect Colonel Chambliss, who had made a charge—I know not by whose orders—and who was falling back before a large force of the enemy. The First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis legion were sent by Colonel Baker, and these two regiments drove back the enemy, but in their eagerness they followed him too far and encountered his reserve in heavy force. Seeing the state of affairs at this juncture, I rode rapidly to the front to take charge of these two regiments, and whilst doing this, to my surprise, I saw the rest of my brigade (except the Cobb legion) and Fitz. Lee's brigade charging. In the hand-to-hand fight which ensued, as I was endeavoring to extricate the First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis legion, I was wounded, and had to leave the field, after turning over the command to Colonel Baker.

The charge of my brigade has been recently explained to me as having been ordered by Captain Barker, Assistant Adjutant-General, who supposed that it was intended to take the whole brigade to the support of Colonel Chambliss—a mistake which was very naturally brought about by the appearance of affairs on the field.

Of what occurred after I gave up the command, I am of course ignorant, nor can I state the casualties of my command. I am only able now to give a brief and bare statement of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of the 3d July, showing how it became engaged. The disposition I had made of my command contemplated an entirely different plan for the fight, and beyond this disposition of my own brigade, with the subsequent charge of the First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis legion, I had nothing whatever to do with the fight.

I am, Major, very respectfully, yours,

WADE HAMPTON, *Brigadier-General.*

Operations of a Section of the Third Maryland Battery on the Mississippi in the Spring of 1863.

By Captain W. L. RITTER.

BALTIMORE, MD., February 27, 1879.

Rev. JOHN WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,

Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:

Dear Sir—I give a few items which may serve as a branch link in the great historical chain that is being forged for the future historian.

April 2, 1863, Lieutenant Ritter was ordered to Deer creek, up the Mississippi river, to take command of a section of the Third battery of Maryland artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Bates, of Waddell's Alabama artillery. This section, with one of Bledsoe's Missouri battery and one of a Louisiana battery, were under the command of Lieutenant Wood, of the Missouri artillery. These sections were all attached to General Ferguson's brigade, that had been operating along the Mississippi, firing into transports and harassing the enemy in every conceivable manner.

In March, 1863, when Porter's fleet, consisting of five gunboats and several transports, entered Black bayou for the purpose of flanking the Confederate batteries at Haynes' bluff, on the Yazoo river, Ferguson's command met the fleet below Rolling fork, and after an engagement which lasted three days, drove it into the Mississippi river, with considerable loss.

Early in April, 1863, General Steel's Federal division, consisting of eight regiments and one battery of artillery, landed at Greenville, Mississippi, and marched down Deer creek about forty miles to the Two-mile canebrake above Rolling fork, through which he made no effort to pass, in consequence of the narrow passage and the impossibility of flanking it on either side. He then returned to Greenville, destroying the gin houses, barns and dwellings for about thirty miles up the creek on his way back. Ferguson's command followed as far as Fish lake and then returned to Rolling fork, except Major Bridges' battalion.

April 29, Lieutenant Ritter, with his section, was ordered to join Major Bridges' battalion at Fish lake, near Greenville, Mississippi.

May 1st he came up with the command, and the next day proceeded to the river to fire upon the boats that were continually

passing. At this time, Grant's army at Vicksburg was being rapidly reinforced, and it was the aim of the Confederate commander to harass the passing troops as much as possible.

The morning of the 4th, having learned from one of Major Bridges' scouts that a transport, heavily laden with stores, was coming down the river, Lieutenant Ritter took his guns and masked them at a point where the current ran near the shore, upon which he had posted his pieces. Soon the black smoke of a steamer was seen rising above the tree tops, above Carter's bend, a few miles off, and shortly afterwards it came in sight. The vessel was sailing rapidly yet quietly, and, as was afterwards learned, the crew anticipated no danger, for they had not asked any of the vessels they passed if the river was clear of Confederate batteries. The cannoniers were ordered to their posts, the guns loaded, and, as the boat came within range, the order "fire" was given. The stillness of the morning was broken by the shrill report of the rifle piece and the loud roar of the twelve pounder howitzer, which in quick succession flamed out upon the unsuspecting crew. The first or second shot cut the tiller rope, and another broke a piston rod of one of the engines. The crew, finding escape impossible, hoisted a white flag and surrendered and brought the boat ashore. Major Bridges and Lieutenant Ritter were the first to board the boat. The prisoners, seventeen in number, were ordered ashore and put under guard.

They had been drinking the night previous, and therefore failed to inquire of the gunboats they passed whether there were any Confederates on the river. A dinner had been prepared for the passengers, but not served. Lieutenant Ritter's command, therefore, though neither invited nor expected guests, were just in season for the savory dishes of the pantry; nor need we add that they greatly enjoyed the excellent turkey, pies, etc., provided for the occasion.

All the wagons, gun carriages and caissons were filled with such articles as the men thought most useful for the soldier, and the balance, much the greater part, with the beautiful boat (Minnesota), a side-wheel steamer, was consigned to the flames.

This was one of the richest prizes captured on the Mississippi river. The boat contained about a quarter of a million dollars worth of stores, and was the property of a Northern speculator.

About 5 o'clock in the evening, two of the enemy's gunboats came in sight and immediately commenced a furious and indiscriminate cannonading of the surrounding plantations, without

the least notification to the inhabitants, save that of the shell, to remove the women and children to a place of safety.

Lieutenant Ritter's section and the sharpshooters lay within three hundred yards of the river, waiting for the enemy to land, but they sailed down the river two miles, where they put a few men ashore.

No further demonstration being made, the battalion returned to camp at Fish lake.

Yours, truly, WILLIAM L. RITTER.

Beauregard's and Hampton's Orders on Evacuating Columbia—Letter from Colonel A. R. Chisolm.

[The following letter from a gallant officer of General Beauregard's staff seems to settle beyond question the character of the orders given when the Confederates evacuated Columbia.]

NEW YORK, March 23, 1879.

REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,

Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:

My Dear Sir—I have read in the April number of the *Society Papers* Colonel James Wood Davidson's communication relative to the burning of Columbia by General Sherman, and it may be a matter of interest in future that I inform you of what took place between Generals Beauregard and Hampton on the evening previous to the evacuation of that city. As Aid-de-Camp to General Beauregard I was the only officer present with the two Generals. Beauregard had arrived late in the day from Charleston. Late in the evening Hampton called on him at the hotel, and after stating the condition of affairs in his front and arranging for the evacuation of the place early the following day, the matter of disposing of the large quantity of cotton piled in the streets was discussed. General Beauregard immediately said that it should on no account be burnt, for by doing so it would only endanger the city; that all railroad communication with the coast was cut off and the enemy could not remain long enough to remove it; whereas, if saved, it would be of much value to the citizens. It was then determined that orders should be issued by General Hampton that none of the cotton should be burnt; this was carried out, as appears by the affidavit of Captain Rawlins Lowndes, who was his Adjutant.

The explosion which took place at the railway depot on the outskirts of the town, about daylight on the morning of the evacuation, was caused by men sleeping among ammunition stored there. The depot alone was destroyed and no fire spread from it. I visited the spot before leaving the city, which I did about nine A. M., as the enemy were entering the town.

An officer of General Sherman's staff (Major Murray), now attached to the New York *Herald's* editorial corps, informed me several years ago that he went to General Sherman and begged him to stop his soldiers from burning the city, and that he turned a deaf ear to him. I furnished General Hampton with the name of this officer at the time, as he authorized me to do so.

Yours, truly,

A. R. CHISOLM.

The Bristoe Campaign—Preliminary Report of General R. E. Lee.

[The following report has never been in print. The reports of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, Major-General R. H. Anderson, Major-General H. Heth, Brigadier-General H. H. Walker, Colonel E. D. Hall and Major D. G. McIntosh were all published by the Confederate Government, but from some cause General Lee's report and other subordinate reports were not. Nor do we know whether General Lee ever wrote his final report, as was his custom, after receiving the reports of his subordinates. If he did, it is not in the War Records' office at Washington, and we fear it was destroyed with other invaluable papers on the retreat from Petersburg. We are indebted to the kindness of the War Records' office for a copy of this report.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
October 23d, 1863.

General S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:

General—In advance of a detailed report I have the honor to submit for the information of the Department the following outline of the recent operations of this army. With the design of bringing on an engagement with the Federal army, which was encamped around Culpeper Courthouse, extending thence to the Rapidan, this army crossed that river on the 9th instant, and advanced by way of Madison Courthouse. Our progress was necessarily slow, as the march was by circuitous and concealed roads, in order to avoid the observation of the enemy. General Fitz. Lee, with his cavalry division and a detachment of infantry, remained to hold

our lines south of the Rapidan. General Stuart, with Hampton's division, moved on the right of the column. With a portion of his command he attacked the advance of the enemy near James City on the 10th, and drove them back towards Culpeper. Our main body arrived near that place on the 11th instant and discovered that the enemy had retreated towards the Rappahannock, removing or destroying his stores. We were compelled to halt during the rest of the day to provision the troops, but the cavalry, under General Stuart, continued to press the enemy's rear guard towards the Rappahannock. A large force of Federal cavalry in the meantime had crossed the Rapidan after our movement began, but was repulsed by General Fitz. Lee and pursued towards Brandy station. Near that place the commands of Stuart and Lee united on the afternoon of the 11th, and after a severe engagement drove the enemy's cavalry across the Rappahannock with heavy loss. On the morning of the 12th the army marched in two columns, with the design of reaching the Orange and Alexandria railroad north of the river and intercepting the retreat of the enemy. After a skirmish with some of the Federal cavalry at Jeffersonton we reached the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs in the afternoon, where the passage of the river was disputed by cavalry and artillery. The enemy was quickly driven off by a detachment of our cavalry, aided by a small force of infantry and a battery. Early next morning (13th) the march was resumed, and the two columns reunited at Warrenton in the afternoon, where another halt was made to supply the troops with provisions. The enemy fell back rapidly along the line of the railroad, and early on the 14th the pursuit was continued, a portion of the army moving by way of New Baltimore towards Bristoe station and the rest, accompanied by the main body of the cavalry, proceeding to the same point by Auburn mills and Greenwich. Near the former place a skirmish took place between General Ewell's advance and the rear guard of the enemy, which was forced back and rapidly pursued. The retreat of the enemy was conducted by several direct parallel roads, while our troops were compelled to march by difficult and circuitous routes. We were consequently unable to intercept him. General Hill arrived first at Bristoe, where his advance, consisting of two brigades, became engaged with a force largely superior in numbers posted behind the railroad embankment. The particulars of the action have not been officially reported, but the brigades were repulsed with some loss and five pieces of artillery, with a number of prisoners captured. Before the rest of the troops could be brought up.

and the position of the enemy ascertained, he retreated across Broad run. The next morning he was reported to be fortifying beyond Bull run, extending his line towards the Little River turn-pike. The vicinity of the entrenchments around Washington and Alexandria rendered it useless to turn his new position, as it was apparent that he could readily retire to them and would decline an engagement unless attacked in his fortifications. A further advance was, therefore, deemed unnecessary, and after destroying the railroad from Cub run southwardly to the Rappahannock, the army returned on the 18th to the line of that river, leaving the cavalry in the enemy's front. The cavalry of the latter advanced on the following day, and some skirmishing occurred at Buckland. General Stuart, with Hampton's division, retired slowly towards Warrenton in order to draw the enemy in that direction, thus exposing his flank and rear to General Lee, who moved from Auburn and attacked him near Buckland. As soon as General Stuart heard the sound of Lee's guns, he turned upon the enemy, who, after a stubborn resistance, broke and fled in confusion, pursued by General Stuart nearly to Haymarket and by General Lee to Gainesville. Here the Federal infantry was encountered, and after capturing a number of them during the night, the cavalry slowly retired before their advance on the following day. When the movement of the army from the Rapidan commenced, General Imboden was instructed to advance down the Valley and guard the gaps of the mountains on our left. This duty was well performed by that officer, and on the 18th instant he marched upon Charlestown and succeeded, by a well concerted plan, in surrounding the place and capturing nearly the whole force stationed there, with all their stores and transportation; only a few escaped to Harper's Ferry. The enemy advanced from that place in superior numbers to attack General Imboden, who retired, bringing off his prisoners and captured property—his command suffering very little loss, and inflicting some damage upon the pursuing columns. In the course of these operations two thousand four hundred and thirty-six prisoners were captured, including forty-one commissioned officers. Of the above number four hundred and thirty-four were taken by General Imboden. A more complete account, with a statement of our loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, will be forwarded as soon as the necessary official reports shall have been received.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Editorial Paragraphs.

A LOUISIANA BRANCH OF THE SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY was organized at New Orleans on the 29th of March by a meeting called by about one hundred prominent Confederates of the city, and of which General F. N. Ogden was President, and Colonel F. R. Southmayd was Secretary. After a statement of the plans, objects, &c., of the Society by General George D. Johnston, our efficient General Agent, the following plan of organization was adopted:

This society shall be known as the Louisiana Branch of the Southern Historical Society, and its object is to collect for the archives of the parent society such historical material relating to the Confederate war as can be secured in the State of Louisiana.

It shall be located at New Orleans, and shall hold meetings at least once each year.

Membership in the parent society shall entitle the person to membership in this society.

The officers shall consist of a president, eight vice-presidents, a corresponding secretary, a recording secretary, a treasurer and an executive committee, who shall hold their offices for one year, or until their successors are elected.

The executive committee shall consist of sixteen members, with power to increase its number, and five of its members shall constitute a quorum.

The officers of this society shall be ex-officio members of the executive committee.

The executive committee is charged with the general direction and management of the interest and work of this society; has authority to adopt rules for its own government (not inconsistent with this plan), and shall at the annual meeting submit a report of its proceedings to the society.

The president shall have authority to call meetings of this society whenever it is thought best.

The following officers were elected.

President, Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D.; Vice-Presidents, General Fred. N. Ogden, General G. T. Beauregard, General J. B. Hood, Governor Francis T. Nicholls, Colonel A. Reichart, Major J. B. Richardson, General Brent, Major J. Moneure; Corresponding Secretary, J. Jones, M. D.; Recording Secretary, F. R. Southmayd; Treasurer, J. B. Lafitte.

Executive Committee—Dr. J. D. Burns, chairman, J. D. Hill, B. J. Sage, W. T. Vaudry, C. E. Fenner, E. A. Palfrey, B. M. Harrod, W. Fearn, J. G. Devereux, L. Bush, J. B. Walton, L. A. Wiltz, Douglas West, N. T. N. Robinson, J. B. Eustis, Archie Mitchell.

The following resolution was adopted:

Resolved, That we heartily welcome General George D. Johnston, the General Agent of the parent society, to New Orleans, and will cheerfully co-operate in assisting him to extend the membership of the society in our midst, and otherwise, as may contribute to the success of his important mission.

We cordially thank our friends for the heartiness with which they have taken hold of this matter, and we anticipate the happiest results from their action. As the Southern Historical Society originated in New Orleans, and

many of the gentlemen prominent in the recent meeting were its original founders (as we showed in our last annual report), it is especially appropriate that we should still have their active co-operation in pushing forward our good work.

FOURTEEN YEARS AGO TO-DAY (April the 9th) seven thousand five hundred ragged, starved, foot sore, weary, but heroic men, with arms in their hands, gathered around our grand old Chief and wept bitter tears as he told them that he was "compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources." They stacked their arms, furled forever their tattered battle flags, and returned home, not to sit in idleness around desolated hearthstones to mourn over blighted hopes, but to go to work with an energy worthy of their glorious record. That these men and those whom they represented have been law abiding citizens—that they have observed to the letter the terms of their parole—that they have deserved confidence and honor from all sections of the country—is a historic fact too patent to need discussion.

The South has honored the Confederate soldier to an extent that has excited the ire of Radical politicians. Our Governors, our Judges, our Legislators, our State and county officers, our Senators and Congressmen, the professors in our colleges, our leading business men, our prominent professional men, our preachers under forty-five years of age—in a word, nearly all of the men occupying positions of honor, emolument or trust which have been filled by the voice of the true people of the South, have been men who "wore the gray," proved true to the land they loved, and have not abandoned their principles since the war. This has resulted not simply from the fact that there is a general feeling that we owe a debt of gratitude to these men which we can never pay, but also for the very obvious reason that *when we select our best men we must choose Confederate soldiers.*

Nor should the people of the North complain of this. If they choose to neglect *their* soldiers, and fill their places of honor with men who were "invisible in war," and are proving themselves "invincible in peace," that is their affair, but they must not expect us to follow their example. We trust the day will never come when our Southern people shall forget to honor the Confederate soldier—when our women shall cease to deck their graves with flowers and teach their children to cherish the memory of those who "died for us," or when the voters of the South shall neglect to put the survivors into the high places within their gift.

But while we are doing this, we should not forget that it is of the very highest moment, that we gather the material for a true history of the principles, the deeds and the character of the Confederate soldier. *The Southern Historical Society* is engaged in just this work, and we think we have a claim on the sympathies and the active help of every Confederate soldier, and all who desire to see vindicated at the bar of history his name and his fame.

THE LEE MAUSOLEUM AT LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA, is being rapidly pushed to completion. The executive committee announced in their report the 29th

of November last that they had received in all \$21,140.25—that they had paid in full for the recumbent figure of Lee \$15,000, and on the mausoleum to receive it \$2,844.67, leaving a balance in the treasury of \$3,296.28, and a deficiency of \$6,183.05 to raise in order to *complete* the mausoleum.

A recent Lexington paper states that only \$2,000 are now needed. Surely the needed amount ought to be *at once* raised in order that at least one fitting monument to our grand old chieftain may be *completed*. Valentine's monument is one of the most splendid creations of genius in this country, and when the beautiful mausoleum designed by Neilson of Baltimore is completed, the tomb of Lee will be fitly decorated and appropriately cared for.

Let the old soldiers of Lee, and his friends and admirers everywhere, rally *at once*, raise the small amount necessary to complete this beautiful monument, and then combine on the grand monument in Richmond, which we are pledged to build.

We are authorized to receive subscriptions, and would be glad to be the medium of sending to Lexington a good part of what remains to be collected.

Send on at once, then, a contribution (large or small) for this noble object.

THE SECOND REUNION OF THE LOUISIANA DIVISION ARMY OF TENNESSEE was held in New Orleans on the 5th of April, and seems to have been quite a brilliant affair. We are glad to hear of all such reunions, and hope that they will keep alive the memories of the brave old days of 61-65. But we again urge that at these "gatherings of the clans" arrangements ought to be made to put on record the heroic deeds of the men who "wore the gray."

Book Notices.

Life of Alexander H. Stevens. By Richard Malcom Johnston and William Hard Browne. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

We are indebted to the publishers for a copy of this beautifully gotten up book, which, in paper, printing and binding, is in the usual style of the work of this famous house.

The literary execution of the book is admirable. Mr. Johnston has been for years an intimate friend of Mr. Stephens, and has had some peculiar advantages in gathering material for a true picture of the *inner* life of the "great commoner." Mr. Browne has added his fine literary taste and skill, and the book is one of deep interest—indeed, a charming specimen of biography. The extracts from Mr. Stephens' private letters, diaries and conversations, as well as from his public speeches, enhance the value of the book.

Mr. Stephens' long public career, his unquestioned ability, and his high character give a certain degree of importance to his utterances. But each one must, of course, judge for himself as to the correctness of many of his opinions and acts. We do not here pass upon them at all.

Destruction and Reconstruction—Personal Experiences of the late War. By Richard Taylor, Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

We are indebted to the publishers for a copy of this really charming book, which we have read with deep interest.

If the style is sometimes pedantic, flippant, and occasionally even coarse, it is always sprightly, often sparkling, and throughout decidedly entertaining. There is not a page in the book over which one could nod. Indeed, we found ourselves riveted to its pages in the "wee'sma' hours" of the morning. A competent military critic, who served under General Taylor the last year of the war, has promised us a full review of the book for our next number. We will, therefore, content ourselves with saying now that General Taylor's descriptions of the campaigns in which he served are very vivid and will be valuable material for the future historian, marred only by the fact that, in the haste of writing, he has not always verified his facts, and is sometimes inaccurate in his statements—e. g., his account of the battle of First Manassas strangely adopts the Federal version that the battle was decided by Johnston's coming to Beauregard's help at a critical juncture of the battle, on the 21st of July, when, if he had consulted the official reports, he would have seen that General Johnston arrived with the bulk of his force the day before, and that the only troops from Johnston's army who arrived during the battle were three regiments under Kirby Smith and Elzey.

General Taylor's criticisms of men and measures are trenchant, sharp and decided, and there will be, of course, difference of opinion as to whether they are always just. For example, we very decidedly protest against his opinion of General Lee as a military man, and so far from admitting that he was merely a master of *defensive* warfare, and that "the tendency of engineer service to unfit men for command" had spoiled him as the leader of great armies and the manager of great campaigns, we believe that when the facts are all brought out, the difficulties against which he contended considered, and the overwhelming numbers and resources opposed to him calmly weighed, the future historian will write Lee down as not only the greatest general which this country has ever produced, but one of the ablest commanders in all history.

Some of General Taylor's pen portraits are very vivid, life-like and accurate. We have space for only his portrait of Stanton, of whom he says: "A spy under Buchanan, a tyrant under Lincoln and a traitor to Johnson, this man was as cruel and crafty as Domitian. I never saw him. In the end, conscience, long dormant, came as Alecto, and he was not; and the temple of justice, on whose threshold he stood, escaped profanation."

The Appletons have brought out the book in a style worthy of their reputation, and it will doubtless have a wide sale.

Since the above notice was penned a telegram announces that General Taylor died in New York on the 12th of April.

In his death a gallant soldier, an able commander, a brilliant writer and a genial, accomplished gentleman has passed from a wide circle of admiring, loving friends.